A slow return: On border tensions and India-China ties
India and China must engage intensely at all levels to resolve border disputes
The government’s decision to offer statements on China, suo motu, in both Houses of Parliament and to brief a parliamentary panel are positive but long overdue steps. Since 2020, following the Chinese transgression along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and the deadly Galwan clashes, it has avoided divulging details of the negotiations with China over the actions of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), only announcing agreements on disengagement at six points of friction, as they occurred in 2021, 2022 and 2024. In a democracy, the people must not be kept in the dark on matters of national interest. But the statements by External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and the briefing by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri appear to have been substantial. Mr. Jaishankar focused on three aspects of the LAC negotiations. He said India has made it clear to China that “normal” engagement in other parts of the relationship were contingent on the LAC tensions being resolved. India has adopted a policy of “continuous engagement” and a step-by-step approach involving 17 meetings of the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs, 21 meetings of the Senior Highest Military Commanders meeting mechanism, and several meetings between the Foreign and Defence Ministers and Special Representatives of both countries. Finally, he said that with disengagement “fully achieved”, the next priorities would be troop de-escalation and de-induction, followed by a discussion on how to manage ties in the border areas, given the problems in the last few years. Mr. Jaishankar said that for Depsang and Demchok, “ patrolling arrangements ” had been agreed upon, but the resumption of patrols is still “underway”. For the other areas of North and South Pangong Tso lake, Gogra and Hot Springs, disengagement had been achieved through “steps of a temporary and limited nature” — a euphemism for LAC “ buffer zones”.
But the government’s nearly 2,500 word statement gave no indication of the casus belli for the Chinese actions nor any reference to when the return to ‘status quo ante’, or to positions of 2020, can be expected. The statement laid stress on India’s “national security” interests being upheld, without mentioning India’s “territorial integrity” at any point. The government must now expedite efforts to build a common understanding of the LAC and to demarcate the boundary. It is important to tell the nation about the nearly 20 Modi-Xi meetings prior to 2020, in spite of which the PLA acted the way it did. The past few years should have demonstrated to the ‘doves and hawks’ in India’s establishment that such an intensive engagement is no guarantor of peace, nor can conflicts be resolved without the kind of intense and “continuous engagement” that New Delhi and Beijing have sustained in the past few years